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Abstract. The paper illustrates how event tree diagrams, used in safety engineering, 
can be applied to test the design of a healthcare service. Event tree diagrams can be 
employed to inform quantitative approaches to quality, by providing justification 
with respect to safety, of operational aspects to be monitored and measured.  
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Introduction 
Quality improvement involves understanding the operational aspects of every service, 
improving potential weaknesses. It considers potential failures in the intended service, 
identifying whether they are plausible, and if so, what controls can be introduced to 
manage their negative effects (e.g., safety risk to patients). Quantitative methods have 
been used in healthcare to identify how operational elements affect the overall goals of 
the service, and subsequently drive quality improvement. The Gershon review [1], 
carried out during 2003-4, stipulated that the UK National Health Service (NHS) would 
be expected to make £6.5bn a year savings by 2008 with an improvement in productivity. 
It was expected that patient care will also improve as a result of the productivity 
improvement. This provided impetus to efforts to introduce the Lean and Six Sigma 
methods in the NHS (although the emphasis has been on the introduction of Lean 
thinking) [2, 3, 4].  
Quantitative methods provide good evidence and data, on which to act, for 
improvement. However, a drawback is that their efficiency depends on the relevance of 
the data collected. For example, a quantitative approach may show a very good 
achievement of a metric X (e.g., 6σ), but metric X may not explain how it achieves a 
wanted attribute (e.g., safety levels of the service) [5]. Compliance to goals prescribed in 
guidance and standards provides some assurance about relevance of metrics. However, 
guidance may not apply as-is to all organisations, due to local variation in practice; 
something that is increasingly appreciated in practice. For example, the UK health IT 
Information Standards Board (ISB) standards ask for an explicit explanation of 
achievement of safety supported by evidence. This entails an understanding of the causal 
chain from failure to harm, as well as the controls employed to manage the associated 
risk.  
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is a method in safety engineering, designed to explore 
the potential outcomes of failures, testing the suitability of the controls in place (or 
highlight the lack of) [6]. ETA can help to identify the critical elements of the service 
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with respect to safety, which should be on the focus of quantitative analysis. The paper 
illustrates, how ETA can be applied to a pathway supporting safety improvement. ETA 
is used to inform quantitate analysis, providing justification about the relevance of the 
parts of the service that should be monitored, with the safety of the service.  
1. Controlling risks in a healthcare service  
When a service is identified as capable to contribute to harm, controls are implemented 
to prevent the harm, or mitigate its effects. There are various types of controls focusing 
on: a) the social aspect of the service (e.g., skill), b) the organisational aspect (e.g. 
procedures and best practice used) as well as on c) the technical aspect (e.g., IT or 
devices). Not all controls are suitable for all circumstances, the characteristics of which, 
as well as their cost, needs to be considered. For example, an IT prescription function 
that checks thousands of doses automatically, can be more effective than manual checks; 
whereas IT is less efficient with unique situations when judgment and research is needed.  
 
 
Figure 1 – A pathway and associated risk controls 
Figure 1 illustrates an example of a healthcare service, annotated with controls 
during each step that have been introduced to prevent harm to the patient.  
2. Using event trees to explore safety outcomes and sufficiency of risk controls  
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is used in safety engineering to assess the potential 
outcomes of an event, which could be detrimental to the intended operation of the service 
(i.e. a failure). Figure 2 illustrates an event tree for the service presented in Figure 1 for 
when a prescribing doctor enters the wrong dosage to the electronic prescription system. 
The event tree documents the service from a safety point of view, exploring all 
hypothetical outcomes, according to whether the risk controls - (c), (d), (e) in this case - 
will work or not. For each risk control, a branch is created in the tree, exploring whether 
a control will sufficiently manage the failure. ETA is a good way to examine the severity 
of each outcome according to the causal path that has led to it, based on the risk 
assessment classifications used in an organisation. In this example, outcome O.1.1.1 has 
been identified as critical as wrong dosage is administered to patient, whereas the others 
as minor due to additional load that they put on the prescribing doctor. It is preferable to 
break the service into manageable event trees, as they can easily become complex, 
deteriorating comprehensibility, and thus defeating their purpose. For example, in this 
case a separate event tree could be drawn with the initiating event wrong dosage 
 
administered to patient (where the event tree in Figure 2 ends), which would explore the 
respective controls. It is worth noticing that detection mechanisms can be seen as risk 
controls. The results of ETA may lead to re-design of the service and its risk controls.  
 
Figure 2– Event Tree Diagram of the prescription pathway 
Quantitative event trees have been used, annotated with the probability of each event, 
to estimate risk (i.e. severity and likelihood of outcomes). Given the initiating event, 
probability P of each outcome can be calculated by the different paths in the event tree. 
For example, for outcome O.1.1.1, P(O.1.1.1) = P(A.1.1.1)*P(A.1.1)*P(A.1). In order to 
create a quantitative event tree data about the failure rates of each control, which requires 
a monitoring mechanism that will collect the necessary metrics.  
3. . Event trees informing the metric selection process 
Event trees and quantitative methods, such as 6-Sigma and statistical analysis, 
complement each other well. Event trees explore a service, but on their own can only 
provide one dimension of risk (i.e. severity), and they need reliable data to estimate the 
likelihood of an outcome, hence defining risk. On the other hand, quantitative methods 
are not alien in healthcare, and provide a good set of methods to collect data. However, 
the relevance of this data is often stipulated in standards, neglecting the actual causal 
chain that can lead to risk in each organization. ETA can interface with quantitative 
approaches, providing the necessary safety justification to formulate safety specific goals, 
which then can be broken down to more detailed metrics. For example, a 6-Sigma 
process can be applied to a 
pharmacist dosage cross-check 
success rate goal. 
By applying ETA we 
manage to establish a viewpoint 
of the service, with the functions 
that are most crucial to safety. 
ETA allows to highlight the risk 
controls that are designed to 
address a failure from harming 
patients. Figure 3 presents a set 
of questions critically 
evaluating the available metrics 
(if any are existing), focusing on 
 
 
Figure 3 – A critical look at metrics 
identifying the probability of a tree branch (i.e. the failure likelihood of a risk control). 
Following establishing whether P can be calculated (steps 1 & 2), step 3 highlights the 
importance to examine potential inference leaps from metrics to conclusion, by asking 
for a justification. Next, accuracy of the metrics is considered; for example, automated 
data collection may be more reliable than questionnaires. Additional data sources that 
validate the result (P) separately should be considered, as this will increase the 
confidence in the data. This may include additional sources locally, but also in the entire 
service (see causal chain validity in next paragraph). Finally, care should be taken to 
check whether these metrics, albeit presented in different format, have a common metric 
in another place (e.g. both extracted by the same source). These metrics would be as good 
as their common metric, and cannot be used to independently verify calculations for P.  
The end goal should be used to check the validity of the causal chain established by 
the ETA (or in combination with other analysis methods). For example, if the observed 
probability (i.e. harm caused) of outcome O.1.1.1 does not match the calculated 
probability of A.1.1.1, it could indicate a problem with the causal chain. This could be 
true even if the observed probability is better than expected, as the team in charge of 
ETA may have missed a control, which if not rectified may lead to the control not being 
properly maintained, becoming in the future even a source of risk. 
Conclusions 
ETA can provide significant benefits to safety analysis of a healthcare service by testing 
potential outcomes of a failure. Participants can examine and discuss the role or risk 
controls and how they are expected to manage risks. ETA can provide necessary context 
to quantitative analysis, justifying the selection of goals (and detailed metrics) explicitly 
with respect to safety. This addresses issues such as relevance of metrics, as well as it 
acknowledges the variation of risk controls in each organisation, something that is not 
addressed by guidance and best practice. The method in the paper also provides a 
framework for critical evaluation of metric collection. Employing this kind of framework 
is expected to contribute to making healthcare services more amenable to safety 
certification, which requires consideration of the causal chain. The work presented in 
this paper has resulted in a rudimentary framework, but further larger scale clinical 
analysis is needed in the future to establish more evidence about the benefits of ETA.  
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